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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new biometric verifica-
tion and template protection system which we call the THRIVE
system. The system includes novel enrollment and authentication
protocols based on threshold homomorphic cryptosystem where
the private key is shared between a user and the verifier. In
the THRIVE system, only encrypted binary biometric templates
are stored in the database and verification is performed via
homomorphically randomized templates, thus, original templates
are never revealed during the authentication stage. The THRIVE
system is designed for the malicious model where the cheating
party may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification.
Since threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is used, a ma-
licious database owner cannot perform decryption on encrypted
templates of the users in the database. Therefore, security of the
THRIVE system is enhanced using a two-factor authentication
scheme involving the user’s private key and the biometric
data. We prove security and privacy preservation capability of
the proposed system in the simulation-based model with no
assumption. The proposed system is suitable for applications
where the user does not want to reveal her biometrics to the
verifier in plain form but she needs to proof her physical presence
by using biometrics. The system can be used with any biometric
modality and biometric feature extraction scheme whose output
templates can be binarized. The overall connection time for the
proposed THRIVE system is estimated to be 336 ms on average
for 256-bit biohash vectors on a desktop PC running with quad-
core 3.2 GHz CPUs at 10 Mbit/s up/down link connection speed.
Consequently, the proposed system can be efficiently used in real
life applications.
Index Terms—Biometric, Security, Privacy, Threshold Cryp-
tography, Homomorphic Encryption, Malicious Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, public and commercial organizations investon secure electronic authentication (e-authentication) sys-
tems to reliably verify identity of individuals. Biometrics is
one of the rapidly emerging technologies for e-authentication
systems [1]. However, it is impossible to discuss biometrics
without security and privacy issues [2], [3]. Biometrics, which
are stored in a smart card or a central database, is under
security and privacy risks due to increased number of attacks
against identity management systems in recent years [2]–[5].
Security and privacy concerns on biometrics limit their
widespread usage in real life applications. The initial solution
that occurs to mind for security and privacy problems is to
use cryptographic primitives. On the other hand, biometric
templates cannot be directly used with conventional encryption
techniques (i.e. AES, 3DES) since biometric data are inher-
ently noisy [6]. In other words, the user is not able to present
exactly the same biometric data repeatedly. Namely, when a
biometric template is encrypted during the enrollment stage,
it should be decrypted to pass the authentication stage for
comparison with the presented biometric. This, however, again
leads to security and privacy issues for biometric templates
at the authentication stage [6]. Another problem with regards
to such a solution is the key management, i.e. storage of
encryption keys. When a malicious database manager obtains
decryption keys, he can perform decryption and obtain bio-
metric templates of all users. Similar problems are valid for
cryptographic hashing methods. Since cryptographic hash is a
one-way function, when a single bit is changed the hash sum
becomes completely different due to the avalanche effect [7].
Thus, successful authentication by exact matching cannot be
performed even for legitimate users due to the noisy nature
of biometric templates. Therefore, biometric templates cannot
directly be used with the cryptographic hashing methods.
Biometric systems which use error correction methods are
proposed to cope with noisy nature of the biometric templates
in the literature [8]–[10]. In such systems, the biometric data
collected at the enrollment stage is exactly the same with the
biometric data collected at the authentication stage since they
use error correction methods. In other words, these systems
can get error-free biometric templates and thus cryptographic
primitives (i.e. encryption and hashing) can successfully be
employed without suffering from the avalanche effect [6],
[10]–[12]. However, high error correcting capability require-
ments make them impractical for real life applications [13].
Furthermore, side information (parity bits) is needed for error
correction and this may lead to information leakage and even
other attacks (i.e., error correcting code statistics, and non-
randomness attacks) [14]. Zhou et al. clearly demonstrate in
their works that redundancy in an error correction code causes
privacy leakage for biometric systems [15], [16].
Although biometric template protection methods are pro-
posed to overcome security and privacy problems of biometrics
[3], [17]–[30], recent research shows that security issues are
still valid for these schemes [31]–[37]. Furthermore, there
are a number of works on privacy leakages of biometric
applications [38], [39], and yet more biometrics template
protection methods [15], [16], [40]. In the literature, Zhou et
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al. propose a framework for security and privacy assessment
of biometric template protection methods [15]. In addition,
Ignatenko et al. analyze the privacy leakage in terms of
the mutual information between the public helper data and
biometric features in a biometric template protection method.
A trade-off between maximum secret key rate and privacy
leakage is given in their works [39], [41].
Recently, homomorphic encryption methods are used with
biometric feature extraction methods to perform verification
via encrypted biometric templates [21], [42]–[44]. However,
these methods offer solutions in the honest-but-curious model
where each party is obliged to follow the protocol, but can
arbitrarily analyze the knowledge that it learns during the ex-
ecution of the protocol to obtain some additional information.
The existing systems are not designed for the malicious model
where each party can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol and
may be corrupted. Moreover, they do not take into account
security and privacy issues of biometric templates stored in the
database [21], [44]. The authors state that their security model
will be improved in the future work by applying encryption
methods also on the biometric templates stored in the database.
Furthermore, some of these systems are just designed for
a single biometric modality or a specific feature extraction
method which also limits their application areas [42], [43].
In addition, an adversary can enroll himself on behalf of any
user to their systems since they do not offer any solutions for
malicious enrollment. Finally, all these systems suffer from
computational complexity.
Biohashing schemes are one of the emerging biometric
template protection methods [26]–[30]. These schemes offer
low error rates and fast verification at the authentication stage.
However, they suffer from several attacks reported in the litera-
ture [34]–[37]. These schemes should be improved to be safely
used in a wide range of real life applications. In our work,
we develop new enrollment and authentication protocols for
biometric verification methods. Our goal is to increase security
and enhance privacy of the biometric schemes. The THRIVE
system can work with any biometric feature extraction scheme
whose outputs are binary or can be binarized. Since biohashing
schemes can output binary templates called a biohash, they can
be successfully used with the proposed system.
A. Our contributions
In this paper, we address adversary attacks in case of an
active attacker who aims to gain access to the system in the
malicious attack model. By taking these adversary attacks into
account, we develop a new biometric authentication system
based on threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. Our main goal
is to increase the security of the system and preserve privacy
of biometric templates of the users. The contributions of this
work can be summarized as follows:
• A new biometric authentication system (which we call
the THRIVE system) is proposed in the malicious model
and the proposed system can be used with any existing
biometric modality whose output can be binarized.
• Even if an adversary gains an access to the database
and steals encrypted biometric templates, he can neither
authenticate himself by using these encrypted biometric
templates due to the proposed authentication protocol,
nor decrypt these encrypted biometric templates due to
the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme.
• Only encrypted binary templates are stored in the
database and biometric templates are never released even
during authentication. Thus, the proposed system offers a
new and advanced biometric template protection method
without any helper data. In addition, only legitimate
users can enroll in the proposed system since a signature
scheme is used with the proposed enrollment protocol.
• The THRIVE system can be used in the applications
where the user does not trust the verifier since she does
not need to reveal her biometric template and/or private
key to authenticate herself and the verifier does not
need to reveal any data to the user with the proposed
authentication protocol.
• Even if an adversary intercepts the communication chan-
nel between the user and the verifier, he cannot obtain
any useful information on the biometric template since
all exchanged messages are randomized and/or encrypted
and he cannot perform decryption due to the (2, 2)-
threshold homomorphic encryption scheme. Furthermore,
he cannot use the obtained data from message exchanges
in this communication channel since nonce and signature
schemes are used together in the authentication.
• The THRIVE system is a two-factor authentication sys-
tem (biometric and secret key) and is secure against ille-
gal authentication attempts. In other words, a malicious
adversary cannot gain access to the proposed system
without having the biometric data and the private key of a
legitimate user by performing adversary attacks described
in [45] as well as hill-climbing attacks [46]–[49].
• In the THRIVE system, the generated protected biometric
templates are irreversible since templates are encrypted
they are irreversible by definition as soon as decryption
key is not stolen.
• The THRIVE system can generate a number of protected
templates from the same biometric data of a user due
to the randomized encryption and biohashing. Thus, it
ensures diversity. Besides, they are also cancelable i.e.
when they are stolen, they can be re-generated.
• A THRIVE authentication protocol run requires only 336
ms on average for 256 bit biohash vectors and 671 ms
on average for 512 bit biohash vectors on a desktop PC
with quad-core 3.2 GHz CPUs at 10 Mbit/s up/down
link connection speed. Therefore, the proposed system is
sufficiently efficient to be used in real-world applications.
The paper is structured as follows. Related work is ad-
dressed in Section 2. Preliminaries are described in Section 3.
The proposed biometric authentication system is introduced in
Section 4. Security proof of the proposed protocols are given
in Section 5. Complexity analysis of the proposed system is
discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Biometric template protection schemes are proposed to miti-
gate the security and privacy problems of biometrics [3], [18]–
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[25]. However, various vulnerabilities of these technologies
are reported in the literature [31]–[33]. Jain et al. classify bio-
metric template protection schemes into two main categories
[3]: 1) Feature transformation based schemes, 2) Biometric
cryptosystems as illustrated in Figure ??.
The main idea behind biometric cryptosystems (also known
as biometric encryption systems) is either binding a cryp-
tographic key with a biometric template or generating the
cryptographic key directly from the biometric template [50].
Thus, the biometric cryptosystems can be classified into two
main categories: 1) Key binding schemes, 2) Key generation
schemes. The biometric cryptosystems use helper data, which
is public information, about the biometric template for veri-
fication. Although helper data are supposed not to leak any
critical information about the biometric template, Rathgeb et
al. show that helper data is vulnerable to statistical attacks
[51]. Furthermore, Ignatenko et al. show how to compute
a bound on possible secret rate and privacy leakage rate
for helper data schemes [52]. Adler performs hill-climbing
attack against biometric encryption systems [32]. In addition,
Stoianov et al. propose several attacks (i.e., nearest impostors,
error correcting code statistics, and non-randomness attacks)
to biometric encryption systems [14].
In the literature, fuzzy commitment [10] and fuzzy vault
schemes [25] are categorized under the key binding schemes.
These schemes aim to bind a cryptographic key with a bio-
metric template. In ideal conditions, it is infeasible to recover
either the biometric template or the random bit string without
any knowledge of the user’s biometric data. However, this is
not the case in reality because biometric templates are not
uniformly random. Furthermore, error correction codes (ECC)
used in biometric cryptosystems lead to statistical attacks (i.e.,
running ECC in a soft decoding or erasure mode and ECC
Histogram attack) [14], [53]. Ignatenko et al. show that fuzzy
commitment schemes leak information in cryptographic keys
and biometric templates which lead to security flaws and
privacy concerns [39], [41]. In addition, Zhou et al. argue that
fuzzy commitment schemes leak private data. Chang et al.
describe a non-randomness attack against fuzzy vault scheme
which causes distinction between the minutiae points and
the chaff points [54]. Moreover, Kholmatov et al. perform a
correlation attack against fuzzy vault schemes [55].
Keys are generated from helper data and a given biometric
template in key generation schemes [3]. Fuzzy key extraction
schemes are classified under key generation schemes and use
helper data [56]–[60]. These schemes can be used as an
authentication mechanism where a user is verified via her own
biometric template as a key. Although fuzzy key extraction
schemes provide key generation from biometric templates,
repeatability of the generated key (in other words stability)
and the randomness of the generated keys (in other words
entropy) are two major problems of them [3]. Boyen et al.
describe several vulnerabilities (i.e. improper fuzzy sketch
constructions may lead information on the secret, biased codes
may cause majority vote attack, and permutation leaks) of
the fuzzy key extraction schemes from outsider and insider
attacker perspectives [61]. Moreover, Li et al. mention that
when an adversary obtains sketches, they may reveal the
identity of the users [62].
Biohashing schemes are simple yet powerful biometric
template protection methods [26]–[30] which can be classified
under salting based schemes. It is worth pointing out that
biohashing is completely different from cryptographic hashing.
Although biohashing schemes are proposed to solve security
and privacy issues, there are still security and privacy issues
associated with them [34]–[37]. In these works, the authors
claim that biohashes can be reversible under certain conditions
and an adversary can estimate biometric template of a user
from her biohash. Consequently, when biohashes are stored in
the databases and/or smart cards in their plain form, they can
threaten the security of the system as well as the privacy of the
users. Moreover, an adversary can use an obtained biohash to
threaten the system security by performing malicious authen-
tication. Furthermore, when the secret key is compromised,
an adversary can recover the biometric template since these
schemes are generally invertible [3].
Non-invertible transform based schemes use a non-invertible
transformation function, which is a one-way function, to make
the biometric template secure [63]–[65]. User’s secret key
determines the parameters of non-invertible transformation
function and this secret key should be provided at the authenti-
cation stage. Even if an adversary obtains the secret key and/or
the transformed biometric template, it is computationally hard
to recover the original biometric template. On the other hand,
these schemes suffer from the trade-off between discrim-
inability and non-invertibility which limits their recognition
performance [3].
Another security approach is the use of cryptographic prim-
itives (i.e. encryption, hashing) to protect biometric templates.
These works generally focus on fingerprint-based biometric
systems. Tuyls et al. propose the fingerprint authentication
system which incorporates cryptographic hashes [66]. They
use an error correction scheme to get exactly the same bio-
metric template from the same user in each session which
is similar to the fuzzy key extraction schemes. They store
cryptographic hashes of biometric templates in the database
and make comparison in the hash domain. However, there is
no guarantee to get exactly the same biometric templates from
the user even if the system incorporates an error correction
scheme in real life applications since it is limited with the
pre-defined threshold of error correction capacity. They also
use helper data which are sent over a public channel and this
may lead to security flaws as well. Moreover, an adversary can
threaten the security of the system when he performs an attack
against the database since he can obtain the user id, helper data
and the hashed version of the secret which is generated by the
biometric data and the helper data. Although the adversary
cannot obtain the biometric data itself in its plain form, he
can get all needed credentials (i.e. hash values of the secrets)
to gain access to the system.
Kerschbaum et al. propose a protocol to compare fingerprint
templates without actually exchanging them by using secure
multi-party computation in the honest-but-curious model [67].
At the enrollment stage, the user gives her fingerprint template,
minutiae pairs and PIN to the system. Thus, the verifier knows
the fingerprint templates which are collected at the enrollment
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stage. Although the user does not send her biometric data at
the authentication, the verifier already has the user’s enrolled
biometric data and this threatens the privacy of the user in case
of a malicious verifier. In addition, a malicious verifier can
use these fingerprint templates for malicious authentication.
Furthermore, since the fingerprint comparison reveals the
matching scores (i.e. Hamming distance [68]), the attacker can
perform a hill climbing attack against this system. Apart from
these security and privacy flaws, the authors just focus on
secure comparison in their protocol and they do not develop
any solutions for the malicious model.
Erkin et al. [42] propose a privacy preserving face recog-
nition system for the eigen-face recognition algorithm [69].
They design a protocol that performs operations on encrypted
images by using the Pailler homomorphic encryption scheme.
Later, Sadeghi et al. improve the efficiency of this system [43].
In both works, they use the eigen-face recognition algorithm
together with homomorphic encryption schemes. However,
they limit the recognition performance of the system with the
eigen-face method although there are various feature extraction
methods which perform better than it. Unfortunately, their
system cannot be used for any other feature extraction method
for face images. Moreover, they do not use a threshold
cryptosystem which prevents from a malicious party aiming
to perform decryption by himself. Storing face images (or
corresponding feature vectors) in the database in plain is
the most serious security flaw of this system. An adversary,
who gains access to the database, can obtain all face images.
Therefore, the adversary can perform the sixth attack type
- attack against the database which definitely threatens the
security of the system and the privacy of the users.
Barni et al. [21], [44] propose a privacy preservation system
for fingercode templates by using homomorphic encryption in
the honest-but-curious model. They, however, do not propose
any security and privacy solutions on the biometric templates
stored in the database. This issue is mentioned as a future work
in their paper. In addition, they do not use threshold encryption
which would prevent from a malicious party aiming to perform
decryption by himself. Therefore, their proposed system is
open to adversary attacks against the database as stated in their
work. They do not address the malicious enrollment issue as
well. Moreover, the user must trust the server in their system.
Although they achieve better performance than [42], [43] in
terms of bandwidth saving and time efficiency, they do not
address the applications where the user and the verifier do not
trust each other (e.g. the malicious model).
There are also some works on secure Hamming distance
calculation by using cryptographic primitives [70]–[73]. These
papers, however, limit their works only with secure Hamming
distance calculation. These methods do not address biometric
authentication as a whole and fails to satify security, privacy,
template protection at the same time by taking into account
computational efficiency which is very critical for real-world
applications. Osadchy et al. [70] propose Pailler homomorphic
encryption based secure Hamming distance calculation for
face biometrics. The system is called SCiFI. Although they
claim that SCiFI is computationally efficient, it mostly uses
pre-computation techniques. Its pre-computation time includes
processing time that must be done locally by each user before
using the system each time. They report that SCiFI’s online
running time takes 0.31 seconds for a face vector of size 900
bits however its offline computation time takes 213 seconds.
Since these computations should be done by the user just
before each attempt to use the system, the protocol is not that
much efficient. Besides, SCiFI is only secure for semi-honest
adversaries. Rane et al. [71] also propose secure Hamming
distance calculation for biometric applications. However, their
proposed method fails to ensure biometric database security
since biometric templates are stored in plain format in the
database. Thus, a malicious verifier can threaten a user’s secu-
rity and privacy. Bringer et al. [72] propose a secure Hamming
distance calculation for biometric application. The system is
called SHADE and it is based on committed oblivious transfer
[74]. However, they also cannot guarantee biometric database
security since biometric templates are stored in plain form in
the database. Kulkarni et al. [73] propose a biometric authen-
tication system based on somewhat homomorphic encryption
scheme of Boneh et al. [75] which allows an arbitrary number
of addition of ciphertexts but supports only one multiplication
operation between the ciphertexts. Although the values stored
on the enrollment server are the XORed values of the biometric
template vector with the corresponding user’s key, the user
first extracts and sends her biometric features to the trusted
enrollment server. Again this system uses a trusted enrollment
server and fails to protect security and to preserve privacy of
a user against a malicious database manager. In addition, the
system is not efficient since 58 sec are required for successful
authentication of a 2048 bit binary feature vector.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Threshold Homomorphic Cryptosystem
In this section, we briefly describe underlying cryptographic
primitives of the protocols. Given a public key encryption
scheme, let m ∈ M denote its message or plaintext space,
c ∈ C the ciphertext space, and r ∈ R its randomness. Let
c = Encpk(m; r) depict an encryption of m under the public
key pk where r is a random value. Let sk be its corresponding
private key, which allows the holder to retrieve a message from
a ciphertext. The decryption is done with the private key sk
as m = Decsk(c).
In a (t, n)-threshold cryptosystem, the knowledge of a
private key is distributed among parties P1, . . . , Pn. Then, at
least t of these parties are required for successful decryption.
On the other hand, there is a public key to perform encryption.
More formally, let P1, . . . , Pn be the participants. We define
a (t, n)-threshold encryption scheme with three phases as
follows:
• In the key generation phase, each participant Pi receives
a pair (pki, ski), where pki and ski are the shares of
the public and secret key, respectively. Then, the overall
public key pk is constructed by collaboratively combining
the shares. Finally pk is broadcast to allow anyone to
encrypt messages in M. The shares of this public key
are also broadcast which allow all parties to check the
correctness of the decryption process.
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• The encryption phase is done as in any public key encryp-
tion cryptosystem. If m ∈ M is the message, a (secret)
random value r from R is chosen and c = Encpk(m; r)
is broadcast under a public key pk.
• In the threshold decryption phase, given that t (or more)
participants agree to decrypt a ciphertext c, they follow
two steps. First, each participant produces a decryption
share by performing Sji = Decskji (c), j = 1, . . . , t.
After broadcasting Sji , they all can apply a reconstruction
function F on these shares so that they can recover the
original message by performing m = F(S1i , . . . , Sti )
where P 1i , . . . , P
t
i represent the group of t participants
willing to recover m.
In case of a (t, n)-threshold scheme, the additional require-
ment is that if less than t parties gather their correct shares
of the decryption of a given ciphertext, they will get no
information whatsoever about the plaintext. In the proposed
system, we use the (2, 2)-threshold cryptosystem between the
claimer (the user) and the verifier where both players must
cooperate to decrypt.
A public key encryption scheme is said to be additively ho-
momorphic if given c1 = Enc(m1; r1) and c2 = Enc(m2; r2)
it follows that c1c2 = Enc(m1+m2; r3) where m1,m2 ∈M
and r1, r2, r3 ∈ R. There are various versions of threshold ho-
momorphic cryptosystems. The most widely used are ElGamal
[76] or Paillier [77] cryptosystems. In our proposal, we will
use a threshold version of Goldwasser-Micali (GM) encryption
scheme (i.e., between a user and a verifier) proposed by Katz
and Yung in [78]. Note that GM scheme is XOR-homomorphic
[79], i.e., given any two bits b1, b2 in {0, 1}, any random values
r1, r2 ∈ R , and any encryptions Enc(b1, r1),Enc(b2, r2), it
is easy to compute Enc(b1 ⊕ b2, r1r2).
In the proposed protocol, we use a variant of the threshold
decryption protocol which is the so-called private threshold
decryption [80]. The requirement of this protocol is that one of
the t parties will be the only party who will recover the secret.
All t− 1 other parties follow the protocol and broadcast their
shares to achieve this requirement. The party who will learn
the plaintext proceeds with the decryption process privately,
collects all decryption shares from the t− 1 other parties, and
privately reconstructs the message. The remaining parties will
not get any information about this message.
1) Threshold XOR-Homomorphic Goldwasser-Micali En-
cryption Scheme: We next give a brief explanation of (2,2)-
GM cryptosystem between two users (in our proposal, between
a user and a verifier) using a Trusted Dealer. We note that one
can also exclude a trusted dealer using the scheme in [78]:
Key generation:
The trusted dealer first chooses prime numbers p and q
(‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = n) such that N = pq and p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4.
The dealer next chooses p1, q1, p2, q2 ∈R (0, 22n) such that
p1 ≡ q1 ≡ 0 mod 4 and p2 ≡ q2 ≡ 0 mod 4. He sets p0 =
p−p1−p2 and q0 = q−q1−q2 and sends (p1, q1) to the first
party and (p2, q2) to the second party. He finally broadcasts
(p0, q0, N).
Encryption of a bit b ∈ {0, 1}:
Choose r ∈R ZN and compute a ciphertext C = (−1)br2
mod N .
Decryption:
All parties compute the Jacobi symbol J = (CN ). If J 6= 1
then all parties stop because either the encryption algorithm
was not run honestly or the ciphertext was corrupted during
the transmission. (Note that (CN ) is always 1, because (
C
N ) =
(Cp ) (
C
q )= 1 (i.e., either (
C
p ) = 1 and (
C
q ) = 1 or (
C
p ) = −1
and (Cq ) = −1)). If J = 1 then the first party broadcasts
b1 = C
(−p1−q1)/4 mod N . The second party (who is going
to decrypt) will privately compute b0 = C(N−p0−q0+1)/4
mod N and b2 = C(−p2−q2)/4 mod N . Finally, the de-
crypted bit b is computed as b = (1− b0b1b2 mod N)/2.
Note that it is easy to see whether C is a quadratic residue
by computing b ≡ C(N−p−q−+1)/4 mod N . The reason
is briefly as follows. We first note that by Euler’s theorem
Cφ(N) ≡ 1 mod N where φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1). We also
know that C is quadratic residue iff Cφ(N)/2 ≡ 1 mod N . If
the Jacobi symbol J = (CN ) = 1 then by using (
C
p ) (
C
q ) = 1 we
have either (Cp ) = 1 and (
C
q ) = 1 or (
C
p ) = 1 and (
C
q ) = 1.
If (Cp ) = 1 (resp. -1) and (
C
q ) = 1 (resp. -1) then C
p−1/2
≡ 1 mod p (resp. −1 mod p) and Cq−1/2 ≡ 1 mod q
(resp. −1 mod q). Hence, for both cases C(p−1)(q−1)/4 ≡
1 mod p and C(p−1)(q−1)/4 ≡ 1 mod q. By the Chinese
Remainder Theorem, we have C(p−1)(q−1)/4 ≡ 1 mod N .
Hence, C is quadratic residue iff b = 1.
B. Biometric Verification Scheme
Biometric verification schemes perform an automatic verifi-
cation of a user based on her specific biometric data (e.g., face,
fingerprint, iris). They have two main stages: 1) Enrollment
stage, and 2) Authentication stage. The user is enrolled to
the system at the enrollment stage. Then, she again provides
her biometric data to the system at the authentication stage
to prove her identity. Any biometric scheme, which provides
binary outputs or whose outputs can be binarized, can work
with the proposed threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. The
THRIVE system can work with any biometric feature extrac-
tion method which produces fixed size vectors as templates
and perform verification with distance calculations between
the enrolled and the provided template at the authentication
stage. When the output of a biometric feature extraction
method is not binary, locality sensitive hashing can be used to
binarize the feature vector [81]. After binarization, the binary
templates can successfully be used with the proposed system.
In this paper, we use biohashing as an example algorithm for
extracting binary biometric templates. Although biohashing
has its own security and privacy preservation mechanism, we
do not rely on these for the security or the privacy preservation
features. Thus it can be replaced with any other binary feature
extraction method.
Biohashing schemes are simple yet powerful biometric
template protection methods [26]–[30]. Biohash is a binary
and pseudo-random representation of a biometric template.
Biohashing schemes use two inputs: 1) Biometric template, 2)
User’s secret key. A biometric feature vector is transformed
into a lower dimension sub-space using a pseudo-random set
of orthogonal vectors which are generated from the user’s
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secret key. Then, the result is binarized to produce a pseudo-
random bit-string which is called the biohash. In an ideal
case, the Hamming distance between the biohashes belonging
to the biometric templates of the same user is expected to
be relatively small. On the other hand, the distance between
the biohashes belonging to different users is expected to be
sufficiently high to achieve higher recognition rates.
We descibe the random projection (RP) based biohashing
scheme proposed by Ngo et al. [82]. In this scheme, there are
three main steps: 1) Feature extraction, 2) Random projection,
3) Quantization. These steps are explained for face biometrics.
1) Feature Extraction: The feature extraction is performed
on the face images, which are collected at the enrollment
stage, belonging to the users, Ii,j ∈ <m×n where i = 1, . . . , n
and n denotes number of users, j = 1, . . . , L and L denotes
number of training images per user. The face images are
lexicographically re-ordered and the training face vectors,
xi,j ∈ <(mn)×1, are obtained. Then, Principle Component
Analysis (PCA) [69] is applied.
yi,j = A(xi,j − w) (1)
where A ∈ <k×(mn) is the PCA matrix trained by the face
images in the training set, w is the mean face vector, and
yi,j ∈ <k×1 is vector containing PCA coefficients belonging
to the jth training image of the ith user.
2) Random Projection: At this phase, a RP matrix, R ∈
<`×k, is generated to reduce the dimension of the PCA
coefficient vectors. The RP matrix elements are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) and generated from a Gauss
distribution with zero mean and unit variance by using a Ran-
dom Number Generator (RNG) with a seed derived from the
user’s secret key. The Gram-Schmidt (GS) procedure is applied
to obtain an orthonormal projection matrix RGS ∈ <`×k to
have more distinct projections. Finally, PCA coefficients are
projected onto a lower `-dimensional subspace.
zi,j = RGSyi,j (2)
where zi,j ∈ <`×1 is an intermediate biohash vector belonging
to the jth training image of the ith user.
3) Quantization: At this phase, the intermediate biohash
vector zi,j elements are binarized with respect to the threshold.
λki,j =
{
1 if zki,j ≥ β
0 Otherwise.
(3)
where λi,j ∈ {0, 1}` denotes biohash vector of the jth training
image of the ith user and β denotes the mean value of the
intermediate biohash vector zi,j .
A biohash vector, Benrolli , for the ith user is stored in the
database at the enrollment stage for verification purpose during
the authentication stage. Note that, Benrolli can be any vector
among λi,j vectors in a real-world application. For simulation
purposes, we take into account all possible biohashes for a user
by computing λi,j . The user is authenticated if the Hamming
distance between Benrolli and Bauthi is below a threshold µ.
n∑
k=1
Bkenrolli ⊕ Bkauthi ≤ µ (4)
where Bkenrolli denotes the k
th bit of Benrolli , B
k
authi denotes
the kth bit of Bauthi , and⊕ denotes the binary XOR (exclusive
OR) operator. Consequently, the verifier decides whether the
claimer is a legitimate user or not according the threshold.
IV. THE PROPOSED BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
SYSTEM
In this section, the proposed biometric authentication system
is introduced. In the proposed system, there are two major
roles: 1. User (Ui) and 2. Verifier (V). The user has control
of the biometric sensor, the feature extractor, and the biohash
generator whereas the verifier has control of the database and
the matcher. We assume that there is a trusted third party (TTP)
which initially sets up the system public/private keys.
The TTP distributes the keys in the proposed system. There
are public-private key pairs (pki, (sk1i , sk
2
i )) which are shared
between the user and the verifier. pki is the public key of the
ith user, Ui, and both the user and the verifier have it. Recall
that, when an enrollment biometric template is encrypted by
pki, this can solely be decrypted using the private key shares of
the user (sk1i ) and the verifier (sk
2
i ) collaboratively since the
proposed system is based on the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic
cryptosystem. Here, sk1i is the private key share of the i
th user,
Ui, and sk2i is the private key share of the verifier. Besides,
there is a public-private key pair (pkUi , skUi) which belongs
to the ith user, Ui, where pkUi is the public key and skUi is
its associated private key to perform the signature operation.
The verifier also has the public key pkUi of the i
th user, Ui.
A. Enrollment Stage
At this stage, the ith user Ui has control over the biometric
sensor, the feature extractor, and the biohash generator whereas
the verifier has control over the database as illustrated in
Figure 1. It is worth mentioning that biometric sensor au-
thentication must be achieved in the proposed system before
executing the enrollment protocol to prevent unauthorized
sensors to be used as clients in the system by malicious
users. This, however, is not explicitly indicated in the protocol
in order not to clutter the paper. The proposed enrollment
protocol is illustrated in Figure 2 and steps of it are introduced
as follows:
1) Step 1: The ith user, Ui, computes her biohash,
Benrolli = B
1
enrolli . . . B
n
enrolli where B
j
enrolli
∈ {0, 1},
j = 1, . . . , n. Next, the user encrypts her biohash,
Cji =Encpki
(
Bjenrolli
)
∀j = 1, . . . , n, by using the pub-
lic key pki. Then, the user signs her encrypted biohash,
SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >), and sends it to the
verifier.
2) Step 2: The verifier V verifies SignskUi (< C
j
i : j =
1, . . . , n >) by using pkUi and stores the signature and
encrypted biohash in the database. These data will be
used for verification at the authentication stage.
Note that the proposed enrollment protocol uses the (2, 2)-
threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. Namely, both the user
and the verifier have to cooperate to decrypt a ciphertext.
Furthermore, the signature ensures that the data stored in the
database are generated by a legitimate user.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the THRIVE enrollment stage: the user has control over the biometric sensor, the feature extractor and the biohash generator whereas
the verifier has control over the database.
User (Ui) Verifier (V)
Public: pkUi , pki = (Ni, p
0
i , q
0
i ) Public: pkUi , pki = (Ni, p
0
i , q
0
i )
Private: skUi , sk
1
i = (p
1
i , q
1
i ),Benrolli= B
1
enrolli . . . B
n
enrolli Private: sk
2
i = (p
2
i , q
2
i )
Compute Cji = Encpki
(
Bjenrolli
)
∀j = 1, . . . , n
−
SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify & Store SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >)
Fig. 2. The Proposed Enrollment Protocol
Lemma 1. Biohashes are not revealed at the enrollment
stage.
Proof. (Sketch) At the enrollment stage, the ith user Ui
first encrypts her biohash and then signs it. After these
computations, Ui sends her encrypted and signed biohash
SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >) to the verifier. Since the
user’s biohash is not sent in plain form, biohashes are not
revealed to the verifier at the enrollment stage.
Lemma 2. An adversary cannot register as a legitimate user
at the enrollment stage.
Proof. (Sketch) At the enrollment stage, the ith user Ui
encrypts her biohash by using the public key pki and then
signs her encrypted biohash by using her private key skUi .
Thus, Ui sends encrypted and signed biohash SignskUi (< C
j
i :
j = 1, . . . , n >) to the verifier. The verifier knows pkUi of
the users. Since the verifier verifies the signature of the user,
an adversary cannot register himself as a genuine user without
having the private key of her skUi for computing SignskUi (<
Cji : j = 1, . . . , n >).
B. Authentication Stage
At this stage, the ith user Ui, has control over the biometric
sensor, the feature extractor, and the biohash generator whereas
the verifier has control over the database, the matcher and the
decision maker as illustrated in Figure 4. Ui tries to prove
herself to the verifier by executing the proposed authentication
protocol shown in Figure 3. Similar to the enrollment case, the
biometric sensor must be authorized by the system before the
authentication protocol is carried out. Steps of the proposed
authentication protocol are as introduced as follows:
1) Step 1: Ui wants to verify her identity by using her
biohash and sends a connection request to the verifier.
Then, Ui computes her biohash Bauthi = B
1
authi . . .
Bnauthi where B
j
authi
∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, . . . , n. Note
that the user cannot produce exactly the same biometric
template at each attempt and this results in different
biohashes computed by the same user. Therefore, Benrolli
and Bauthi are different biohashes although they are
generated by the same user at different sessions (enroll-
ment and authentication). First, Ui chooses a random
vector rji ∈R {0, 1} ∀ j = 1, . . . , n. She computes
Rji = r
j
i ⊕ Bjauthi ∀j = 1, . . . , n. Then, Ui generates a
nonce, nonceUi , which is uniquely defined and contains
information about user id, session id and timestamp.
Finally, the user sends < Rji : j = 1, . . . , n >, nonceUi
to the verifier.
2) Step 2: The verifier retrieves SignskUi (< C
j
i :
j = 1, . . . , n >) from the database where Cji =
Encpki
(
Bjenrolli
)
∀ j = 1, . . . , n. Then, it generates
a nonce nonceVi which contains information about the
verifier, session id and timestamp. Finally, it sends
SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >), nonceVi to the user.
3) Step 3: The user verifies SignskUi (< C
j
i : j =
1, . . . , n >) by using public key pkUi . She computes
C ′ji = Encpki(r
j
i ) · Cji = Encpki(rji ⊕ Bjenrolli) ∀ j =
1, . . . , n. Then, she performs partial decryption over C ′ji ,
i.e., T 1,ji = Decsk1i (C
′j
i ) = (C
′j
i )
(−p1i−q1i )/4 mod Ni, ∀
j = 1, . . . , n using her private key share sk1i . Finally, she
sends SignskUi (< Encpki(r
j
i ), T
1,j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >,
nonceUi , nonceVi ) to the verifier.
4) Step 4: V verifies the signature SignskUi (<
Encpki(r
j
i ), T
1,j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >, nonceUi , nonceVi)
by using the public key pkUi . Then, it computes
C ′′ji =Encpki(r
j
i ) ·Cji (this is done to assure correctness
of the result and will prevent a malicious user
computing different values than expected.). Next, the
verifier performs the full decryption by computing
T 2,ji =Decsk2i (C
′′j
i ) = (C
′′j
i )
(−p2i−q2i )/4 mod Ni
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User (Ui) Verifier (V)
Public: pkUi ,pki = (Ni, p
0
i , q
0
i ) Public: pkUi , pki = (Ni, p
0
i , q
0
i ),
SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >)
Private: skUi , sk
1
i = (p
1
i , q
1
i ),B
j
authi
= B1authi . . .B
n
authi Private: sk
2
i = (p
2
i , q
2
i )
Choose rji ∈R {0, 1} ∀j = 1, . . . , n
Compute Rji = r
j
i ⊕ Bjauthi∀j = 1, . . . , n
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
< Rji : j = 1, . . . , n >,nonceUi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Retrieve SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >),nonceVi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >)
Compute C ′ji =Encpki(r
j
i ) · Cji = Encpki(rji ⊕ Bjenrolli)∀j = 1, . . . , n
Compute T 1,ji =Decsk1i (C
′j
i ) = (C
′j
i )
(−p1i−q1i )/4 mod Ni ∀j = 1, . . . , n
−−−−−−
SignskUi (< Encpki(r
j
i ), T
1,j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >,nonceUi ,nonceVi)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify SignskUi (< Encpki(r
j
i ), T
1,j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >,nonceUi ,nonceVi)
Compute C ′′ji =Encpki(r
j
i ) · Cji
Compute T 2,ji =Decsk2i (C
′′j
i ) = (C
′′j
i )
(−p2i−q2i )/4 mod Ni
Compute T 3,ji = C
′′j
i
(N−p0i−q0i+1)/4
mod Ni
Compute decrypted bits T ji = (1− T 1,ji T 2,ji T 3,ji mod Ni)/2
Compute
∑k
j=1R
j
i ⊕ T ji ≤ µ
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Accept or Reject
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 3. The Proposed Authentication Protocol
and T 3,ji = (C
′′j
i )
(N−p0i−q0i+1)/4
mod Ni. Finally,
the verifier computes the decrypted jth bits T ji =
(1 − T 1,ji T 2,ji T 3,ji mod Ni)/2 and the Hamming
distance between Rji and T
j
i is calculated as follows:
n∑
j=1
Rji ⊕ T ji ≤ µ (5)
where µ is the distance threshold. Therefore, the verifier
decides whether the user is authentic with respect to the
pre-defined distance threshold. Note that the Hamming
distance between rji ⊕ Bjenrolli and r
j
i ⊕ Bjauthi is equal
to the Hamming distance between Bjenrolli and B
j
authi
.
Finally, the verifier sends its decision (either Accept or
Reject) to the user. However, the user may get dummy
output if there is an error or an attack (i.e., override
response attack) in the communication channel. The
proposed system can easily be updated to cope with such
an attack, for instance, by allowing the verifier to sign
its decision including the nonces generated during the
authentication session (i.e., either Sign(Accept, nonceUi ,
nonceVi ) or Sign (Reject, nonceUi , nonceVi ) and then
sends it to the user. In this way, authenticity, integrity
and origin of the data can easily be verified. Besides,
signing the nonces (nonceUi and nonceVi ) also makes
the communication unique and avoids replay attacks.
Lemma 3. Biohashes are not revealed at the authentication
stage.
Proof. Authentication is performed in a randomized domain.
In other words, the authentication is determined by comparing
Rji and T
j
i . An adversary can only obtain R
j
i and T
j
i which
are revealed at the authentication stage. Recall that these are
randomized biohashes. Thus, from the adversary’s perspective,
there are three unknowns (rji , B
j
enrolli
and Bjauthi) and two
equations which are shown in the below.
Tji = r
j
i ⊕ Bjenrolli (6)
Rji = r
j
i ⊕ Bjauthi (7)
where rji is the random bit generated by the Ui for the j
th bit.
Since this is a system of linear equations with fewer equations
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the THRIVE authentication stage: the user has control over the biometric sensor, the feature extractor and the biohash generator
whereas the verifier has control over the database, the matcher and the decision maker.
than unknowns, the system has infinitely many solutions.
Consequently, it is impossible for the adversary to obtain
a legitimate user’s biohash by using T ji and R
j
i which are
revealed at the authentication stage. As a result, the proposed
biometric authentication system ensures security and privacy.
V. SECURITY PROOF OF THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION
PROTOCOL
In this section, we prove that the proposed authentication
protocol shown in Figure 3 is secure against malicious user and
verifier. In this proof, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time simulator that produces a protocol transcript which is
statistically indistinguishable from the one resulting from a
real execution of the authentication protocol. The simulator
must perform its task without knowing the private information
of the party who proves her identity [83]. We show that given
a party is corrupted (either a user or verifier), there exists a
simulator that can produce a view which is statistically indis-
tinguishable from the view of that party interacting with the
other honest party. Assuming that one party is corrupted, we
build an efficient simulator that has access to the public input
and private secret shares of the secret key of the corrupted
party. Besides, the simulator knows the public output. We want
to point out that the simulator already knows the shares of the
secret key of the corrupted party before the simulation is run.
Since the threshold cryptosystem is set up before the protocol
starts, we assume that the simulator extracts this information
when the distributed key generation is run.
It is worth mentioning that the proposed authentication
protocol gives computational privacy to both the user and
the verifier due to the semantic security of the underlying
cryptosystem. Furthermore, it is shown that the proposed
authentication protocol is simulatable for both parties and
these simulations produce views which are statistically indis-
tinguishable from the views in the real protocol executions.
Theorem 1. The proposed authentication protocol, which is
shown in Figure 3, is secure in the presence of static malicious
adversaries.
Proof. We show that given a party is corrupted, there exists
a simulator that can produce a view to the adversary that is
statistically indistinguishable from the view in the real protocol
execution based on its private decryption share as well as
public information.
Case 1 - User Ui is corrupted. In this case, we prove the
security for the case where Ui is corrupted. The simulator
has the private key share of the user sk1i , the user’s private
key skUi , and the user’s biohash B
j
authi
apart from the user’s
public information (i.e., pkUi and pki) as described in the
proposed authentication protocol. The simulator constructs a
view for the user which is statistically close to the one the user
observes when interacting with the honest verifier by using this
information. The simulator proceeds as follows:
1) The simulator first obtains < Rji : j = 1, . . . , n >
,nonceUi . As in the second round of the real proto-
col, the simulator needs to output the signature of the
encrypted biohash of the user. To do so, the simula-
tor computes C˜ji = Encpki(B
j
authi
) ∀ j = 1, . . . , n
by using the user’s public key pki, and then com-
putes SignskUi
(〈
C˜ji : j = 1, . . . , n
)〉
. The simulator
also generates a nonce called ˜nonceVi . The values
SignskUi
(〈
C˜ji : j = 1, . . . , n
)〉
and ˜nonceVi are the
simulated outputs. Note that the simulator uses B˜auth
instead of Benroll since it is the only available biohash
to him.
2) The simulator obtains SignskUi (< Encpki(r
j
i ), T
1,j
i :
j = 1, . . . , n >,nonceUi , ˜nonceVi) as in the second
round of the protocol. The simulator next verifies the
signature SignskUi (< Encpki(r
j
i ), T
1,j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >
,nonceUi , ˜nonceVi) that Ui would run. Next, it computes
C˜ ′′ji =Encpki(r
j
i ) · C˜ji .
Given C˜ ′′ji , its plaintext and the share of private key
sk2i of the user Ui the decryption shares T
2,j
i can be
simulated as follows: The simulator computes b˜0 =
[C˜ ′′ji ]
(N−p0−q0+1)/4 mod N from the public informa-
tion and computes b˜1 = [C˜
′′j
i ]
(−p1−q1)/4 mod N since it
knows sk1i (i.e., p1, q1). Let’s denote b˜ for the plaintext of
C˜ ′′ji . Then, the simulator can compute b˜2 mod N ≡ (1−
2˜b)/(b˜0b˜1) mod N (which is T
2,j
i in the real protocol).
Note that in the real setting this is not possible since the
plaintext inside the ciphertext is unknown C˜ ′′ji .
Similarly, T 3,ji can also be simulated since p
0
i and q
0
i are
known by the simulator. The simulator finally computes∑k
j=1R
j
i ⊕ T ji .
Each step of the proposed authentication protocol for the
simulator is simulated and this completes the simulation for
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the malicious user. The transcript is consistent and statistically
indistinguishable from the user’s view when interacting with
the honest verifier.
Case 2 - The verifier V is corrupted. We now prove the
security for the case where the verifier is corrupted. The
simulator has the private key share of the verifier (sk2i ) apart
from the verifier’s public information ( i.e., pkUi , pki, and
SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >)) as described in the
proposed authentication protocol. The simulator constructs a
view for the verifier which is statistically close to the one when
interacting with the honest user by using this information. The
simulator proceeds as follows:
1) Note that the simulator already knows < Cji : j =
1, . . . , n > because of the knowledge of SignskUi (<
Cji : j = 1, . . . , n >). The simulator chooses a random
bit r˜ji and arbitrary B˜
j
authi
∈R {0, 1} and computes
R˜ji = r˜
j
i⊕B˜jauthi . Recall that the simulator must perform
its task without knowing the private information of the
honest user in this case. Thus, although it does not
have real rji and B
j
authi
it can successfully execute the
simulated conversation since R˜ji is uniformly random.
2) The simulator obtains SignskUi (< C
j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >).
The simulator verifies the signature SignskUi (< C
j
i : j =
1, . . . , n >) (by using the user’s public key pkUi ) that V
would run. Next, it next computes C˜ ′ji = Encpki(r˜
j
i )·Cji .
3) Given C˜ ′ji , its plaintext (which is r˜
j
i ⊕Bjenrolli ) and the
share of private key sk2i of the verifier V the decryption
share T˜ 1,ji can also be simulated as follows: The simula-
tor computes b˜0 = [C˜
′j
i ]
(N−p0−q0+1)/4 mod N from the
public information and computes b˜2 = [C˜
′j
i ]
(−p2−q2)/4
mod N since it knows sk2i (i.e., p2, q2). Let’s denote b˜
for the plaintext of C˜ ′ji . Then, the simulator can compute
b˜1 mod N ≡ (1 − 2˜b)/(b˜0b˜2) mod N (which is T 1,ji
in the real protocol). Note that in the real setting this is
not possible since the plaintext inside the ciphertext is
unknown C˜ ′′ji .
4) Finally, the simulator needs to simulate the signature
SignskUi (< Encpki(r
j
i ), T
1,j
i : j = 1, . . . , n >
,nonceUi ,nonceVi). However, this is not possible since the
simulator does not know skUi . In order to successfully
simulate this final step, we need to provide additional
information to the simulator. For example, performing a
following modification over the the key generation phase
in the real protocol the simulation will be possible:
• During the key generation in the real protocol, the
private key skUi is distributed to the user Ui and V
in a threshold fashion. For example, distributed RSA
setting can be used for the signature algorithm (note
that for an RSA setting (e, n) denotes the public key
and (p, q, d) denotes the private key where n = pq
and ed ≡ 1 mod (p−1)(q−1)). Namely, the private
key d can be divided into d1 and d2 such that the
ciphertext c can be decrypted together with Ui and
V as m ≡ cd ≡ cd1+d2 mod n.
• In order to simulate, instead of signing procedures,
Ui will compute an encryption, compute its partial
decryption and finally will send to the verifier. This
will assure that the user indeed used its private
decryption key over the encrypted value. Next, the
verifier will also compute its partial decryption and
will compute the decrypted value privately.
Hence, with this modified version the decryption share
can be simulated in a similar way as described at the
third step of the simulation.
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication
protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes
the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript is
consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the verifier’s
view when interacting with the honest user.
VI. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the THRIVE
enrollment and authentication protocols. The complexity of
the THRIVE enrollment and authentication protocols are ex-
amined in terms of protocol steps for the round complexity,
the number of cryptographic operations for the computational
complexity and the number of messages exchanged by the
two parties for the communication complexity. Without loss of
generality, we will provide complexity of the THRIVE proto-
cols using the (2,2)-threshold homomorphic GM cryptosystem
as an instance [79]. In the protocol we use (2,2)-threshold
XOR homomorphic GM cryptosystem for confidentiality (i.e.,
encryption and decryption) while for signature generation and
verification a conventional cryptosystem such as RSA (using
the key pair (pkUi , skUi)) is employed.
The round complexity of the enrollment protocol is only
one. For the computational complexity, the enrollment pro-
tocol requires n XOR-homomorphic encryptions, and one
conventional signature generation for a user, but one signature
verification for the server. For the communication complexity,
the user sends a conventional signature and n ciphertexts (i.e.,
Cji for j = 1, . . . n).
In the authentication protocol, there are only four rounds.
For the computational complexity of the authentication pro-
tocol, the user generates one conventional signature and
verifies another, computes n XOR-homomorphic encryp-
tions and n XOR-homomorphic decryptions, and performs n
modular multiplications over homomorphic ciphertexts (i.e.,
Encpki(r
j
i ) · Cji for j = 1, . . . n). The verifier verifies one
conventional signature, computes n + 2 modular multiplica-
tions, 2n decryptions, and performs n Jacobi computations to
check Encpki(r
j
i ) for j = 1, . . . n. In total, there are n XOR-
homomorphic encryptions, 3n XOR-homomorphic decryp-
tions, two signature verifications, one signature generation,
n Jacobi computations, and 2n + 2 modular multiplications
during the entire authentication protocol.
For the communication complexity of the authentication
protocol, the user sends 2n homomorphic ciphertexts, one
conventional signature and one nonce value. The verifier sends
one conventional signature, n homomorphic ciphertexts, and
one nonce to the user. In total, 3n homomorphic ciphertexts,
two conventional signatures, and two nonce values are ex-
changed.
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Fig. 5. Comparison between the THRIVE system and the existing solutions.
3 denotes that the system satisfies the property whereas 7 denotes that the
system does not satisfies the property.
In the following, we provide timing estimates for the entire
protocol for 80-bit security level, on a desktop computer,
which has Intel processor with various clock speeds (2.4 GHz
and 3.2 GHz). On the computer one modular multiplication
using Montgomery arithmetic takes about 2000 clock cycles.
Furthermore, one decryption operation in XOR homomorphic
GM cryptosystem takes only a single modular multiplication.
On the other hand, one decryption in XOR homomorphic GM
cryptosystem requires one modular exponentiation operation
which takes about 3.2 million clock cycles. In addition, one
signature generation and verification operation in conventional
cryptosystem such as RSA are equivalent to one modular
exponentiation operation.
The bandwidth usage of the proposed protocol for various
lengths of biohashes of the user are given in Table I. The
required bandwidth for the proposed protocol increases with
the increasing length of the biohashes. Bandwidth usage also
affects the overall connection time.
TABLE I
BANDWIDTH (TOTAL NUMBER OF BITS EXCHANGED) USAGE OF THE
PROPOSED PROTOCOL.
Length of Biohash Bandwidth (Kbits) Time @ 10 Mbit/s (ms)
112 348 35
192 594 59
256 791 79
512 1577 158
2048 6296 630
The computation times for the user and the verifier at 2.4
GHz for the proposed protocol with different biohash lengths
are given in Table II. Naturally, it is expected that the required
computation times of the proposed protocol increase as lengths
of the biohashes increase.
We compare the communication complexity of the proposed
system with the existing systems in the literature assuming
that all systems run on a computer platform with 2.4 GHz
clock speed. Erkin et al.’s system [42] requires 56.25 ms,
Barni et al.’s system [21], [44] requires 50 ms and Sadeghi
et al.’s system [43] requires 25 ms for authentication at the
server side for single user with 112 bit binary feature vector
TABLE II
COMPUTATION TIME FOR THE USER AND THE VERIFIER AT 2.4 GHZ.
Length of Biohash User Time (ms) Verifier Time (ms)
112 151 449
192 258 769
256 343 1026
512 685 2050
[21]. On the other hand, our solution requires 449 ms for
the same authentication set-up. Although existing solutions
seem faster than the proposed system, they propose their
solutions in the semi-honest model whereas our solution is
secure under malicious adversary model. The comprehensive
comparison between the proposed system and existing systems
are shown in Figure 5. It is clearly seen in Figure 5 that the
proposed THRIVE system offers superior security and privacy
preservation solutions under malicious attack model.
The similar timing estimations are also computed for
3.2 GHz as shown in Table III.
TABLE III
COMPUTATION TIME FOR THE USER AND THE VERIFIER AT 3.2 GHZ.
Length of Biohash User Time (ms) Verifier Time (ms)
112 113 337
192 193 577
256 257 769
512 514 1537
2048 2051 6146
We compare the communication complexity of the proposed
system with the existing systems at 3.2 GHz in the literature.
Kulkarni et al.’s system [73] requires 58 s at the server side, 10
ms at the user side and 400 Kbit bandwidth usage for authenti-
cation of single user with 2048-bit binary feature vector at 3.2
GHz. Our proposed system requires 6146 ms at the server side,
2051 ms at the user side and 6296 Kbit bandwidth usage for
the same authentication set-up. Thus, it is faster than Kulkarni
et al.’s system. In addition, our proposes system offers other
advantages such as that it is secure under malicious adversary
model, that the biometric is protected via both a template
protection method (e.g., biohash) and cryptographic primitives
(e.g. threshold homomorphic encryption). On the other hand,
Kulkarni et al.’s system offers solution for semi-honest model
which also means that it is insecure for the malicious model.
The comprehensive comparison between the proposed system
and existing systems are shown in Figure 5.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a novel biometric authentication
system. The aim of the proposed system is to increase security
against adversary attacks defined in [45] when an adversary
wants to gain access to the system as a legitimate user.
We propose novel enrollment and authentication protocols to
increase the security against attacks reported in the literature
and preserve the privacy of users. The proposed system can be
used with any biometric feature extraction method which can
produce binary templates or whose outputs can be binarized.
The biohashing is chosen as an example binary biometric
template generation system since it offers satisfactory error
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rates and fast authentication. The comparison is performed in
a randomized domain in the authentication stage and the binary
templates (e.g., biohashes) are never released. In addition, only
encrypted binary templates are stored in the database. Since
we use the (2, 2)-threshold cryptosystem, the verifier cannot
decrypt the data stored in the database by himself. Namely,
the user and the verifier both has to cooperate to decrypt
the encrypted binary templates. The proposed system can be
used in applications where the user is not willing to reveal
her biometrics to the verifier although she needs to proof her
physical presence by using biometrics. The THRIVE system is
suitable for applications where the user and the verifier do not
necessarily trust each other. Furthermore, the proposed system
appears to be sufficiently efficient compared to the existing
scheme and can be used in real-life applications.
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